A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries by Khan, Mushtaq H.
A Typology
of Corrupt
Transactions
in Developing
Countries
Mushtaq H. Khan
IDS Bulletin Vol 27 No 2 1996
12
1 Defining Corruption
lt is difficult to construct a definition of corrup-
tion which is not dependent on the moral or nor-
mative judgements of the observer. Indeed it
may not be desirable to do so. On the other
hand, a definition of corruption which is clearly
ethical is also subjective and a discussion of
causes and consequences would require prior
agreement amongst all participants about the rel-
evant normative values. This is why corruption
is usually defined in most social science discus-
sions in terms of deviations from legal norms
which are objectively observable, without ques-
tioning the morality or legitimacy of the legal
norms themselves. This allows discussion to take
place at the cost of ruling out some important
activities which in an everyday sense would be
identified as corrupt.
While the norm-based definition allows a clear
identification of corruption, it can nevertheless be
problematic. Legal norms change over time and
vary across countries. What we require is an inves-
tigation of specific practices which have been
identified as corrupt (Scott 1972). For example, if
collusion of a particular type is a corrupt practice
in one country but not another, we should not sim-
ply look at the effect of collusion in the first coun-
try; but should instead identify its effects across
countries. Only in this way will we understand the
implications of failing to enforce its prohibition in
the first country Fortunately, most of the types of
corruption we are concerned with are illegal in
most countries.
Furthermore, we are not concerned with illegal acts
generally since corruption usually refers only to
illegal decisions made by individuals in positions of
public authority A useful working definition of
corruption based on this approach is widely used
(Nye 1967). Corruption is defined as behaviour
which deviates from the formal rules of conduct
governing the actions of someone in a position
of public authority because of private-regarding
motives such as wealth, power or status. The
goals of power and status are difficult to model,
but it is relatively easy to model the economic
effects of private wealth-seeking behaviour on the
part of officials. This is the starting point for the
economic analysis of corruption.
2 Some Facts
There is a strong perception amongst observers that
corruption must have something to do with the lack
of development in some countries. We would then
expect either the scale of corruption to vary across
good and bad performers or the types of corruption
to vary across these countries. It is difficult to mea-
sure the scale of corruption with precision but it is
clear that corruption is not limited to unsuccessful
countries (see Ades and di Tella in this issue).
Fairly substantial corruption has been reported in
Taiwan's public sector (Wade 1990). In late 1995
ex-president Roh Tae Woo of South Korea was
arrested for corruption. He admitted accumulating
a personal fortune of roughly $US 650 million
while in office. This is the first publicly acknowl-
edged figure for corruption at the highest level in
South Korea and most observers believe it is the tip
of a very large iceberg. While we may never be able
to compare accurately the scale of corruption across
countries, it is clear that it is difficult to attribute the
much better performance of a South Korea or a
Taiwan to the absence of corruption in these
countries.
Nor is it possible to distinguish between countries
in terms of the types of transactions which are
subject to corruption. Bureaucrats in virtually
every country have the power to allocate rights over
scarce resources. This power is enhanced when the
state plays an interventionist role in industrializa-
tion which is typical in most developing countries.
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that
bureaucrats universally bargain for a share of the
rents they help to create. Such rent-sharing cor-
ruption by bureaucrats in countries like Pakistan or
Bangladesh is well known and has been the basis of
a number of explanations of poor performance in
such countries. However, similar practices are now
known to have been commonplace in the NICs and
in particular ici South Korea.
The democratization of South Korea in the 1980s
has resulted in revelations of the extent of such
transfers in the heyday of industrial policy A major
case which came to the surface in the 1990s was the
decision of the Chun administration to disband the
Kukje group chaebol (the Korean word for a large
diversified holding company) when its chairman
refused to make appropriate transfers to President
Chun's chosen funds. The Kukje case was the
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beginning of a series of revelations which culmi-
nated with the trial of Roh Tae Woo. Major chaebol
such as Daewoo and Hyundai have now been impli-
cated in massive transfers to state bureaucrats as a
routine part of Korean industrial policy Regardless
of any moral judgements, these transfers did not
lead to stagnation. On the contrary the power of
the South Korean state which allowed it to impose
transfers on industry has also been very useful in
allowing it to impose the performance criteria criti-
cal for the success of its industrial policy (Amsden
1989).
Rent-sharing by bureaucrats typically happens in
the context of patron-client transactions. Patron-
client transactions refer to a set of exchanges which
overlap with corrupt transactions. Often the domi-
nant relationship underlying corrupt transfers is a
patron-client relationship between the state acting
as patron and its clients, who are recipients of sub-
sidies, licenses or other valuable resources. The
state in its status of patron is able to organize collu-
sive transfers where officials can participate in a
share of the resources being transferred to clients or
in a share of the wealth that is eventually created as
a result of the resource transfer.
Corruption in patron-client exchanges is usually
thought to have negative consequences because it
favours particularistic arrangements which favour
specific clients. This results in allocative ineffi-
ciency because the most deserving recipients do not
necessarily get access to public resources. This is
the implicit argument in, for instance, Stanley
Kochanek's (1993) description of patron-client rela-
tionships in government-business interactions in
Bangladesh. In Kochanek's view, patron-client
transactions play a major part in the explanation of
economic backwardness in Bangladesh. While par-
ticularistic arrangements are not always corrupt,
they usually involve transactions which are. For
instance, the allocation of a public resource to
favoured clients may not be illegal, but the kickback
to the bureaucrat or politician almost invariably is.
However, patron-client reliitionships were also
prevalent in dramatically successful countries.
Once again, South Korea provides the countervail-
ing evidence. The collusion between government
and business in this country is now well docu-
mented. A small number of chaebol received very
particularistic assistance in building up specializa-
tion in specific sectors. Production facilities were
transferred across chaebol particularly in the 1980s
to achieve economies of scale and international
competitiveness. Such patron-client contacts
inevitably led to benefits flowing to companies close
to the ruling regime with kickbacks to state officials
and the president's party.
The evidence, such as it is, suggests that the prob-
lem is not the extent of corruption (though that
may be a factor) nor even the kinds of transactions
which are particularly subject to corruption. It sug-
gests that we should instead try and see whether
there were more subtle differences in the types of
corruption which can account for the differences in
observed effects.
3 Conventional Models of the
Effects of Corruption
The economic analysis of corruption aims to iden-
tify types of corruption in terms of their economic
effects. The primary economic effect of corruption
is an allocative one if as a result the final user of a
resource is someone other than the one who would
have had access to the resource otherwise. A sec-
ondary economic effect may be that in addition
resources are lost in the process of corruption
resulting in a decline in social output overall. Early
economic models were interested in the first aspect
of the problem but recently attention has shifted to
the secondary effect in rent-seeking and transaction
cost models.
3.1 Allocative effects
The allocative effect of corruption depends on a
comparison of the output (or welfare) associated
with the allocation which would have taken place
without the corruption with the output (or welfare)
associated with the allocation ex post. There are
two possibilities. In the first, the initial allocation is
more efficient or welfare-promoting than the subse-
quent allocation. Corruption here is clearly harm-
ful. In the second, the post-corruption allocation
is more efficient or welfare promoting than the
initial allocation. In this case corruption is actually
beneficial.
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To determine whether corruption in a particular
case is harmful or beneficial we need information
about:
the initial allocation, given by the initial alloca-
tion of rights and the output or welfare associ-
ated with this;
the ability of different classes of agents to
demand the re-allocation or creation of rights.
This determines the demand-side for corrup-
tion and tells us the effective demand for creat-
ing or re-allocating partïcular rights through
corrupt transactions; and
iii the ability of state officials to change rights.
This determines the supply-side of corruption
by determining which rights can be re-allocated
in response to corrupt transactions.
3.2 Corrosive effects
There are clearly effects of corrupt transactions
which are over and above the allocative ones. The
most obvious such effect is an increase in the insta-
bility of all property rights when corruption exceeds
a critical level. Even when the initial structure of
rights is such that corruption may be beneficial, too
much corruption can lead to a loss of confidence in
the institutional structure of society The effect may
be that social order breaks down totally, resulting
in anarchy This is the subject of game-theoretic
models of social order but it is difficult to be pre-
cise about the level of corruption at which the
corrosive effects outweigh any allocative effective.
Most economic models concentrate on the alloca-
tive effects.
4 Mainstream Analysis
We can now identify the assumptions in main-
stream approaches which analysts have used to
reach particular conclusions. Corruption can
enhance efficiency if the initial structure of rights
was inefficient. But for corruption to actually have
this effect, we also require that state bureaucrats are
able to supply the changes in rights which increase
efficiency and that these are also the changes which
are demanded by wealth-seeking agents in society
Some of the early models of corruption, such as
Leff's (1979) analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, used
such reasoning to conclude that corruption can
have beneficial effects. The assumption was that
the initial situation was characterized by competi-
tion-retarding restrictions which gave privileged
profits to some people. Corruption opened up
competition by persuading bureaucrats to create
new rights enabling other suppliers to enter pro-
tected markets. However, it was patently clear that
in many of the actual cases where corruption was
observed, it would be hard to argue that corruption
was having any positive effect at all.
It would be tempting to argue that in successful
countries corruption transferred useful rights while
in unsuccessful countries the rights transferred
were restrictive and inefficient ones. In fact, we do
not see systematic differences in the types of rights
being purchased in dynamic as opposed to stagnant
countries. We have seen in Section 2 that in the
most successful countries business interests have
had to pay for allocations of subsidized credits,
import licenses and tariffs just as in many of the
least successful countries.
These similarities are due to the imperatives of late
development which made most developing coun-
tries attempt variants of industrial policy
Developing country states have typically attempted
to control access to credit, foreign exchange and
other key inputs as part of industrialization strate-
gies. For instance, a comparison of industrial pol-
icy in South Korea and Pakistan in the 1960s shows
that in both these countries the state was allocating
subsidies while creaming off part of the benefits
which these subsidies conferred on their recipients.
The difference between the two industrial policy
regimes was that, while the South Korean state
could impose performance criteria on its clients, the
Pakistani state could not.
4.1 The demand for rights
Going beyond an examination of the rights trans-
ferred, conventional theory has looked at the effects
of both the demand and supply structure of the
market in rights. The first set of contributions came
from rent-seeking theory which looked at the effects
of different demand structures for rights. Instead
of focusing on the effects of corruption on the
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allocation of rights, these theories focused on the
costs of organizing the re-allocation through
corruption or otherwise. Consider the simplest
case where corruption only results in a transfer.
Suppose I had rights over a resource but as a result
of corruption these are transferred to you. If we
value the resource identically then as far as society
is concerned, the transfer is costless because total
output/welfare in unaffected. However, there is a
cost to society if resources are used up in organizing
the transfer: this is the rent-seeking cost. This is
the cost of the resources used up in the process of
bargaining, waiting and haggling and are quite dis-
tinct from the sums which are actually transferred
as a result of corruption (Varian 1989). Neverthe-
less, the distinction between the size of the transfer
and the rent-seeking loss is frequently forgotten in
the literature.
For this approach to explain the large differences in
the effects of corruption across countries there
would have to be substantial differences in rent-
seeking costs across countries. The key variable
identified in these theories which explains the size
of the rent-seeking loss is the competitiveness of the
political market. This determines the size of the
resources used up in the process of bargaining. The
assumption is that the cost individuals are willing to
incur in rent-seeking activities depends on the
probability of acquiring the right. However, the
results of these models are generally indeterminate.
Under some circumstances greater competition can
reduce the rent-seeking loss. Under others, a
restriction of competition has the same effect.
The contributions of Congleton (1980) and
Rogerson (1982) are illustrative. Congleton com-
pares democratic versus dictatorial re-allocations of
rights and shows that whether democracy leads to
greater competitive waste or not depends on the
minimum bribes legislators are willing to accept. If
the minimum effective bribes are very small,
democracy can result in very small transfers.
Assuming that the rent-seeking cost is proportional to
the transfer, this means low rent-seeking costs.
However, this result is overturned if the minimum
effective bribe is very large, or, (a point which
Congleton does not discuss) if legislators keep
changing their minds in response to further offers.
Thus even in this simple model, while the degree
of competition matters, the effect depends on
exogenous factors including the bargaining power
of legislators.
Rogerson in contrast argues that restricting the
competition over rights to a few players can restrict
the total transfers and by implication the rent-seek-
ing loss. This result too depends on exogenous fac-
tors, in particular on whether the competition spills
over into other sectors. For instance, the restriction
of competition to a few players can result in an
eventual political contestation of the legitimacy of
the regime. If this were to happen, the rent-seeking
cost with a few players could eventually be much
higher than with a larger number of players. The
low cost of rent-seeking in South Korea in the
1960s could have more to do with society not con-
testing the legitimacy of the government-business
networks rather than the number of chaebol com-
peting for rights being small in number.
The theoretical indeterminacy of these demand side
models is important because their results have
sometimes been uncritically used. With relatively
small changes in assumptions, these models can
show that either democracy or authoritarianism is
better at controlling rent-seeking costs. Even in
their own terms, the results depend critically on
exogenous factors, in particular the balance of
power between the bargaining parties and the
intensity of contestation by third parties not
involved in the patron-client exchanges.
Let us return to our comparison of South Korean
and Pakistani industrial policy in the 1960s. In
both cases, the demand structure for key state sub-
sidies was quite similar. A small number of indus-
trial houses competed with each other for access to
state subsidies. In South Korea the strategy suc-
ceeded and the overall rent-seeking cost was low.
In Pakistan the strategy failed because players out-
side the restricted set of industrial houses could
effectively make demands on the state and eventu-
ally brought down the regime. The cost of this
secondary contestation was very large and was
clearly part of the cost of allocating rights in this
way The important conclusion is that the social
cost of a particular method of allocating rights can-
not be read off from the competitiveness of the
market for rights as defined by the number of
players in that market.
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4.2 The supply of rights
A second group of theories examined the effects of
different agency structures supplying new rights
through corrupt transactions. Does the organiza-
tion of the state matter in determining the size of
corrupt transfers? The economic analysis of the
structure of state agencies providing rights attempts
to answer this question. This has been the
approach of Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
State bureaucrats are assumed to provide a
restricted supply of a useful range of rights (such as
different licenses required to set up an industry).
Shleifer and Vishny distinguish between three cases
shown in Figure 1. The first is where the state is
centralized and a single agency is the sole supplier
of all the relevant rights. State bureaucrats maxi-
mize their income from bribes by restricting the
joint supply of the separate rights to their profit-
maximizing level. The second case is one where a
number of state agencies compete in the provision
of complementary rights. Thus one agency may
provide the right to import raw materials, another
may provide the right to set up a factory, and a third
may provide access to credit. If the different agen-
cies are not centralized and independently try to
maximize profits for themselves, each faces a pris-
oner's dilemma. In attempting to maximize rents
for itself, each may be raising the price of the par-
ticular right it supplies so high that overall activity
shrinks and the total rent collected by all agencies
falls. The final case is one where there are a num-
ber of agencies but they can each supply all the rel-
evant rights. This is equivalent to a number of
mini-states within the state, each competing for a
share of the business. The outcome here is radically
different. Each of the mini-states wishes to supply
a package deal to purchasers with all the comple-
mentary rights necessary to set up the business.
Competition between the mini-states now has the
very desirable theoretical result of pushing the price
of the package of rights to zero and therefore total
rents collected to zero as well.
The Shleifer-Vishny policy conclusion is straightfor-
ward. Corruption is best dealt with by increasing
the competition amongst bureaucrats and allowing
more agencies to supply similar righ(s. The aim is
to approximate the third Column. The worst case
is that of competing agencies supplying comple-
mentary inputs (Column 2 in Figure 1). Here the
Rgure 1 The Shleifer-Vishny Classification of Corruption
Structure of Agencies Supplying Rights
One Agency Competing Agencies Competing Agencies
Supplying All Rights Supplying Each Supplying
Complementary All Rights
Rights
Overall Collection
of Bribes
Level of Each
Bribe
Highest Intermediate Lowest
Intermediate Highest Lowest
lack of coordination between agencies leads to a
lower total rent being collected but only because the
level of activity in the economy has shrunk. The
absolute monopoly case (Column 1) is marginally
better. The bribe for each right sold is lower here,
but the total bribe collected is higher because the
economy operates at a higher level of activity
The Shleifer-Vishny classification is useful for dis-
tinguishing extreme cases of state fracturing. When
a large number of state agencies each monopolize
some but not all the rights essential for economic
activity, we do have a transition to Column 2 with
its spiralling bribe levels and falling total bribe
takes. However does this distinction between
agency structures account for the differences
observed in the performance of corrupt developing
countries?
The fragmentation of the state which Column 2
describes is relevant for countries well on the way
to anarchy It requires subordinate state agencies to
declare independence and to be able to enforce it.
It is important to understand what this entails. It
means that an agency such as the one providing
industrial licenses can insist on a bribe level for
these rights independently of other agencies and
regardless of what happens to the aggregate level of
economic activity This is not the case with impor-
tant rights even in fairly weak states such as
Pakistan or Bangladesh.
The rights associated with important projects
requiring the permission of a number of agencies
are typically transacted at a high enough level of the
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state to encompass the complementary agencies.
Indeed some of the worst performing cases such as
Haiti under Duvalier, Bangladesh under Ershad or
the Philippines under Marcos are closer to the
monopoly case in Column 1 of Figure 1 rather than
Column 2. The big leader has a hand in every pot
and clearly has an interest in maximizing the total
rent collected.
On the other hand, some of the most successful
countries do not correspond to the competitive
supply case of Column 3 but are also closer to
Column 1. Shleifer and Vishny admit that the
Korean state 'approximates to the monopolistic
model and find it puzzling that it has not suffered
the same fate as other monopolistic suppliers.
Clearly there are some differences in the organiza-
tional structure of the state bureaucracy supplying
rights across countries and these supply side fea-
tures can explain part of the difference in the effects
of corruption between them. However, most orga-
nizational structures relevant for the supply of
rights through corruption are located between the
monopolistic and oligopolistic cases summarized in
Columns 1 and 2 in Figure 1. The differences
between them (while they may still be quite impor-
tant) do not appear to be big enough to explain the
dramatic differences between a Haiti and a Taiwan,
or a South Korea and a Bangladesh.
5 The Political Settlement,
Clientelism and Corruption
The weakness of conventional economic models of
corruption is that the context of political power in
which corruption takes place is not explicitly
analysed. The balance of power betweeii state
agencies and different classes of agents is an impor-
tant determinant of the effects of the bargain
between state bureaucrats and their clients. The
balance of power determines what is demanded, by
whom and on what terms. It also determines the
feasible responses of the state to such demands,
given the structure of supply We will refer to a par-
ticular balance of power as a political settlement.
Conventional models assume that a structure of
well-defined rights exists and that the bargaining
between state and society takes place on the basis of
these rights. Corruption is therefore seen as an
essentially ecohomic phenomenon where rights are
transferred to the agents who value them the most,
given a pre-existing distribution of economic
resources. Implicit in the assumption of well-defined
rights is an assumption about the political settle-
ment. lt is assumed that the state is an effective
state when it comes to the protection of existing
rights.
This is assumed even in the Shleifer-Vishny model
with competing state agencies supplying comple-
mentary rights. The state may have disintegrated as
a centralized entity but it is still assumed that each
segment of the state is selling well-defined rights.
The power of the state vis-à-vis society in defining
rights in general is not in question. The assumption
that the state can protect well-defined property
rights is a simplification which prevents a useful
analysis of the effects of corruption. The political
settlement in most developing countries is far
removed from the ideal-type implicitly assumed in
standard neo-classical economic theory
In varying degrees, the actual political settlement
in most developing countries places the state in a
relatively weak position as far as the protection and
enforcement of property rights is concerned.
Typically there are continuous political challenges
coming from excluded sections of society contest-
ing the existing allocation of rights. The state is
usually only partially capable of effectively protect-
ing existing rights. The economic bargains
between the state as patron and its clients, which
are sometimes but not always corrupt, take place in
this context. Our argument (Khan forthcoming) is
that the outcomes of these economic transactions
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depend on the context of political contestation in
which the economic transactions are negotiated.
Looking at the balance of power between the state
and its clients, at one extreme would be the con-
ventional patron-client model. Here the state as
patron is the politically dominant partner and dis-
penses resources to clients to get a share of the rent
or simply additional political support. In practice,
the balance of power between patron and client is
often tilted the other way in post-colonial develop-
ing countries, States often lack legitimacy and face
perpetual challenges from politically powerful and
well organized social groups. Here clients, or rather
the social groups from which particular clients are
drawn, are relatively much more powerful than in
the first case and can extract much better bargains
from the state.
To distinguish between the two types of patron-
client relationships, we identify two ideal-types.
We call the power balance underlying the conven-
tional patron-client relationship a patrimonial
political settlement. In contrast, we call the politi-
cal settlement where clients are relatively more
powerful a clientelist political settlement. The
characteristic feature of the clientelist political set-
tlement is that the property rights defined by the
state are weakly-defined and are contested by
well-organized social groups who are able to
challenge the rights being enforced by the state.
This political settlement is fairly typical of many
post-colonial countries.
A characteristic feature of the clientelist political
settlement is that in the face of such contestation,
agents granted rights by the state have to make pay-
offs to other clients (often through the mediation of
the state) to continue to have access to the incomes
generated by their assets. Examples of such payoffs
include employment generation for organizationally
powerful groups, bribes to lower level functionaries
whose power lies in the ability to contest rather
than deliver, payoffs to local mafias and so on.
5.1 The political settlement and
the structure of demand
The patrimonial political settlement corresponds to
the assumptions in conventional economic models
of corruption. The state has the power to protect
rights and to re-allocate them at a price. The (inde-
terminate) results summarized earlier from conven-
tional rent-seeking and agency structure models are
relevant for this case.
Under a clientelist political settlement, the bargain-
ing problem changes. We now have a situation
where groups of clients can politically contest rights
and depending on the effectiveness of their political
organization, bureaucrats are likely to give them
preferential 'prices' for the rights they require.
Compared to the patrimonial political settlement,
the preferential allocation of rights to politically
powerful clients amounts to a payoff which the
clientelist coalition gets from the state. Thus in this
situation the terms of the economic bargain,
whether corrupt or not, will depend on the distrib-
ution of political power and the exposure of the
state to clientelist contestation.
What this means is that the transfer or creation of
rights will not simply be in response to the eco-
nomic price clients are able to pay, but also on their
relative political power. Shifts in the balance of
power can now affect the efficiency of economic
transactions between the state and its clients. In
Pakistan and Bangladesh these exogenous shifts in
the power balance correlate quite well with changes
in the observed efficiency of the rights created
through state intervention (Khan forthcoming).
Thus in the clientelist political settlement, the effec-
tive demand for rights is determined not just by the
distribution of purchasing power but also by the
distribution of political power. The effects of cor-
ruption are therefore specific to the particular dis-
tribution of power between the state and competing
groups of potential clients. This makes it possible
for apparently similar corrupt transactions to have
very different effects in different countries.
5.2 The political settlement and
the supply of corruption
The clientelist political settlement also has implica-
tions for the supply of rights. Another consequence
of a power balance favouring clients is that while it
may be relatively easy to create new rights, it is very
difficult to change or transfer existing rights in ways
which hurt powerful constituencies. If the state is
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politically weak to start with, it is not likely to do
anything which reduces its political viability fur-
ther. The existing rights of clients are likely to have
been negotiated in the past on the basis of political
power. Unless this power has diminished, the
transfer of rights, even if another agent is willing to
pay heavily for it, will have to be considered in
terms of political costs and benefits for state. This
means that even when some agents are willing to
bribe to change the structure of rights, the state may
be politically unwilling to consider reallocations of
rights. This does not happen in the patrimonial
political settlement or in the models considered in
conventional economics.
If existing rights cannot be changed except at great
political cost, the state may prefer to create new
rights. The proliferation of new rights may give the
appearance of a disarticulated state machinery as in
the Shleifer-Vishny classification of competing
state agencies providing complementary rights
(Column 2 Figure 1). But here the causality behind
the proliferation is quite different.
The proliferation does not happen because the
organizational structure of the state is fragmented,
preventing potential coordination amongst state
agencies. In fact in many countries with corrupt
leadership, the supreme leader is nominally in a
monopolistic position. He usually takes a cut from
all agencïes and is aware of the major projects
which are going on. Instead the proliferation hap-
pens because it is politically impossible to make
the monopoly effective as this would override the
interests of powerful sets of clients. If too many
clientelist coalitions are affected, their political
opposition would seriously threaten the political
viability of the state.
Thus under a clientelist political settlement we
would see a proliferation of rights as new rights
are created rather than existing ones being re-allo-
cated. This is quite different from the scenario in
Column 2 of Figure 1 where we see a proliferation
of agencies which results in the price of rights
being driven up. The proliferation of rights has
important economic implications such as excessive
entry into protected industries, excessive employ-
ment creation for white collar workers and so on.
Figure 2 A classification of corruption under different political settlements
Political settlement
Type of corruption Patrimonial Clientelist
Efficient
Inefficient
Initial Rights Inefficient
and Corruption allows
Intervention/Correction
Initial Rights Efficient and/or
Large Rent-Seeking Costs
and/or Coordination Failure
Between Agencies
Rare: Only if Efficient
Rights can be created which
do not hurt existing Clients
Norm: Efficient Rights
Cannot be Created,
Inefficient Rights Cannot
be Destroyed
5.3 An alternative typology of
corrupt transactions
The summary of the effects of the political settle-
ment presented above suggests that the effects of
corruption will depend on the balance of power
under .which such transactions are carried out.
Figure 2 shows an alternative classification which
distinguishes between patrimonial and clientelist
political settlements. This classification suggests
that the results of conventional models are valid if
at all for a particular balance of power between the
state and its clients. It requires a political settle-
ment which allows the state to protect well-defined
rights in the conventional way We have termed
this the patrimonial political settlement.
In contrast the clientelist political settlement is
characterized by weakly-defined rights and here the
relative political power of clients matters in deter-
mining the payoffs they get from the state. Corrupt
transactions in this context are likely to lead to the
failure of rights being re-allocated even when this is
socially desirable and even if this would be eco-
nomically beneficial to state officials in the sense of
maximizing their bribes. We would also expect the
clientelist political settlement to lead to a prolifera-
tion of rights which may also be inefficient.
The political economy informing the support of lib-
eralization as a means of dealing with corruption
and its associated social losses can be assessed in
the light of our discussion. Liberalization will suc-
ceed in lowering the social costs associated with
corruption if the costs of corruption are due to
inadequate competition for rents on the demand
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side or inadequate competition between self-suffi-
cient agencies on the supply side. The demand-side
argument is based on contingent assumptions in
rent-seeking theories. The supply-side argument is
even weaker and the ideal type shown in Column 3
of Figure 1 is an unrealistic portrayal of the actual
experience of successful developers.
If the problem of inefficiency associated with cor-
ruption is due to the operation of corruption in a
clientelist political settlement, liberalization may
have little effect in reducing inefficiency The con-
testation of the state's legitimacy will not necessarily
decrease simply because the state declares itself tO
be negotiating the supply of fewer rights. The evi-
dence of liberalization in developing countries sug-
gests two possible outcomes. If political opposition
to liberalization is very strong it is likely to be
implemented partially and in an ad hoc manner as
has happened in the Indian subcontinent.
Alternatively, the contestation over rights can
become truly anarchic with local mafias enforcing
rights for politically powerful groups in return for
large payoffs. In either case an improvement in effi-
ciency is unlikely to occur.
See following page for references.
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